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ADDENDUM CONTENTS 
Court Opinions of Central Importance to Appeal 
PAGE DESCRIPTION 
1 Article I, Section 7 [Due Process of Law] 
1 Article I, Section 26 [Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory] 
1 Article I, Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] 
2-15 Herring v New York 442 U.S 853. 95 Sup.Ct. 2550. 
45 LEd. 2d 593 (1975) 
16-22 Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital 
7 Utah 2d 39. 318 P2d 330 (Utah 1957) 
** Parts of Record of Central Importance 
** Trial Court must sign an order of an agreed upon statement of facts 
by the parties which will be submitted hereafter acknowledging that no closing 
argument was permitted or allowed by the trial court. Court of Appeals has 
previously signed an order approving said submission. 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules 
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^JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of date of judgment. 
[Judgment filed June 10, 1998 (Wed.), Notice of Appeal filed My 7, 1998 
(Tues.)] "Entry date" of original judgment was 6/10/98; appeal was filed 7/7/98. 
Objections and Exceptions to the trial court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment were filed 7/7/98. 
**There exist question whether such Objections and Exceptions 
constitute "motion which requires the case be returned to the trial court 
to resolve prior to further appellate action "since the Finding of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law are not consistent with the court's oral articulation of same 
from the bench. 
There exists no evidence in the trial record that the trial court has ever 
ruled upon the post-judgment motion, there exists no minute entry, no record of 
hearing, no signed order, or any other document evidencing court's consideration 
of what appellant maintains is a post-judgment motion; therefore, the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court is clouded by this omission. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 [Appeal as of right: how taken.] 
[(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments.] 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 4 [Appeal as of right: when taken.] 
[(a) Appeal from final judgment and order.] 
[(b) Time for appeal shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other 
such motion] 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
UCA 78-2a-3(2)(e) "Court of Appeals Jurisdiction" 
[(2)(h) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity] 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Article VIII Section 5 Constitution of Utah 
[Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right of appeal.] 
[Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, 
there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over 
the cause.] 
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STATEMEN" 1 
Issue on appeal is whether therf * •- -*n ab<%nhifr 3 
argument in a civil case, and if failure to grant same violates fundamental 
principles under Article I, Section 27 of the Utah State Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
. '. otduiisrifc ;nis 
particular issue, as nv ud&c /er arisen in thp sta 
a denial of the right to make closing argument in a non-jury civil case, although 
there does exist Utah Supreme Court case law discussing the right to make a 
closing argument in a civil jury case. See: Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day 
Saints Hospital 7 I i*» »2d 330 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Statutes, rules and other authorities which are determinative: 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7 [Due Process of Law] 
Article I, Section 26 [Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory] 
Article I, Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] 
U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
Herring v New York 
442 U.S 853, 95 Sup.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1975) 
UTAH CASE LAW 
Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital 
7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P2d 330 (Utah 1957) 
Bud ol Appellant Case No 9X-IH79 CA Page S 
RudenvRuden Utah Court of \ppeaK 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I'linilitf lili il i | i l i l n i i l in i hi, alimony | n MUM il the Decree of 
Divorce [1989] based ii|iini iuiilli|il< quniiuls IIU.IIUIIIUI l iy mil liuiih il lu adulli i y 
co-habitation, or in the alternative unlawful fornication contrary to public policy. 
Plaintiff was further seeking termination of alimony on further grounds that he had 
retired and thus there was a substantial change in circumstances. Defendant 
tilnri rnunlfM pHtlinn In mciease ulinmiP' ni in Ihc alternative to continue it n1 the 
s;.ime ILVLI Get in the Decieu ul ULUI .L LUSUJ UII JII|.LIILUIIJII LIIILI I. .ilh IHLIII 
agreement at the time of the divorce. Both parties are in agreement that i n im il 
divorce decree had been entered by stipulation and that there was in fact a 
provision lor review ot the alimony provision in the decree. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5/27/97 Plaintiff filed a petition to terminate or modify alimony 
provision of divorce decree dated 8/22/89 based upon the fact that he had retired 
for reason of "reduction in force" and that his source of income was retirement 
and payments from a pension benefit plan which defendant waived interest in at 
the time of divorce. 
6/27/97 Defendant filed counter-petition for modification alleging that 
alimony should continue at same amount, but did not dispute that there was a 
stipulation at the time of divorce, that defendant had retired, and that her 
condition had improved. 
There was a two day trial to the court, non-jury. Day one of trial was held 
January 29, 1998 and day two April 24, 1998 for reason trial could not be 
concluded on consecutive days. Just prior to completion of evidence on day two, 
the court announced sua sponte to both parties that it would not allow 
summation or closing arguments, thus neither party was allowed to marshal 
evidence or to argue circumstances that were related to their case. Court then 
immediately entered its findings orally from the bench. From the court's written 
judgment appeal was taken; however, court has never ruled upon post 
judgment motion framed as objection and exception. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Denial of right to make a closing argument was not appropriate for the 
trial court and constituted error as a matter of law, since closing argument is so 
fundamei; can jurisprudence max its denial constitutes reversible error, 
at bf • t 
with instructions that the parties be granted an opportunity 
argument and thereby marshal the evidence and adequately develop the 
record before the trial court issues a decision. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
DENIAL OF RIGHT TO MAKE ANY CLOSING ARGUMENT 
WHATSOEVER CONSTITUTES ERROR AS A MATTER OF 
LAW REQUIRING JUDGMENT TO BE REVERSED OR CASE 
REMANDED FOR PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE PARTIES 
TO MAKE CLOSING ARGUMENT AND MARTIAL THE 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT IS ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 
Utah Supreme Court has recognized that one of the essential functions 
of trial counsel is that of arguing the case to the fact finder; Therefore, counsel 
should be permitted to closing argument to refer to and use all of the competent 
evidence that has been marshaled and presented in the trial, and to explain 
its meaning and argue its significance to counsel's theory of the case. 
Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital 
7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P2d 330 (Utah 1957) 
" . . .@ pg. 333.. This emphasizes the importance of 
according plaintiffs counsel the opportunity of performing one 
of his essential functions: that of arguing his case to the jury. 
In doing so, he should be permitted to refer to and use all of 
the competent evidence he has marshaled and presented in 
the trial, and to explain its meaning and argue its significance 
to his client's cause...." 
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DUTY OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
The right to closing argument in Utah has been recognized as an essential 
function of trial counsel and furthermore has been framed as a duty of counsel. 
State v Kazda 540 P2d 949 (Utah 1975) 
" . . . @pg. 951. . . It is our opinion that it is not only 
the prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, to analyze all 
aspects of the evidence; and this should include any pertinent 
statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn therefrom as 
to what the evidence is or is not, and what it does or does not 
show...." 
BROAD LATITUDE ALLOWED 
Given the essential function of closing argument and duty of counsel to 
conduct same, it has been recognized that trial counsel should be afforded broad 
latitude, considerable freedom, and wide discretion in expressing to the jury or 
fact finder his view of the evidence. 
State v Bautista 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P2d 530 (Utah 1973) 
".. .@ pg. 116... The prosecutor in summing up his case 
before the jury as well as defense counsel has a wide discretion 
and is entitled to exercise considerable freedom in expressing 
to the jury his view of the evidence." 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
The right to closing argument has been recognized in a criminal case 
to be a right granted by the Utah Constitution. 
See: State v St. Clair 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P2d 323 (Utah 1955) 
Article I, Section 12 Utah Const. [Rights of Accused Persons] 
Also See: URCrP Rule 17 "The Trial" 
".. .(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side 
or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the 
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by 
responding to the defense argument. The court may set reasonable 
limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be 
allowed for argument." 
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CLOSING ARGUMENT IS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE 
The right to be heard in closing argument in a civil case is an element of a 
"fair trial," deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. The right is so deeply rooted 
that it can safely be said that it is a 'fundamental principle "which is essential 
to a free government and therefore basis for such right can be found in the 
Utah Constitution. 
Utah Const., Article I, Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government." 
Utah Const. Article I, Section 26 [Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory] 
"The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared 
to be otherwise." 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the right to closing argument 
in a non-jury criminal case as one which rises to the level of a constitutional right 
to assistance of counsel and which has been characterized as a "fundamental 
right" which even extends to defendants in state criminal prosecution through the 
14th Amendment. 
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BASIC ELEMENT OF ADVERSARY PROCESS 
In Herring v New York, 442 US 853, 95 SCt 2550, 45 LEd 2d 593 (1975) 
the court recognized that closing argument is a basic element of the adversary 
fact finding process, and that right should be accorded to every party regardless 
of how simple, clear, unimpeached, or conclusive the evidence may seem. 
It is only after all of the evidence is in that counsel for parties are in a position 
to present their respective versions of the case as a whole, and only then 
could they argue the inferences to be drawn from all the testimony and 
point out weaknesses in the adversary's position. 
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MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
The underlying premise of the adversary system is that partisan advocacy 
on both sides of the case will best promote the fact finding process, and that no 
aspect of such advocacy could be or is more important than the opportunity finally 
to marshal the evidence for each side for submission of the case for judgment. 
The language of the court perhaps best states the reason and purpose of 
closing arguments as follows: (Herring v New York, supra.) 
".. .@ pg. 601.. .Some cases may appear to the trial judge 
to be simple-open and shut-at the close of the evidence. And 
surely in many such cases a closing argument will, in the words 
of Mr. Justice Jackson, be 'likely to leave [a] judge just where it 
found him.' But just as surely, there will be cases where closing 
argument may correct a premature misjudgement and avoid 
an otherwise erroneous verdict...." 
".. .@ pg 601 ... [8a] This present case is illustrative. This 
three-day trial was interrupted by an interval of more than two 
days-a period during which the judge's memory may well have 
dimmed, however conscientious a note-taker he may have been...." 
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BENCH TRIAL NO DISTINCTION MADE 
The court furthermore in a footnote rejected any assertion or contention 
that the right to make a closing argument should be recognized in a jury trial but 
not in a bench trial; that footnote and the language thereof is significant and set 
out as follows: (Herring v New York, supra) 
".. .@ pg. 601. . .Footnote 15 The contention has been 
made that, while a right to make closing argument should be 
recognized in a jury trial, there is insufficient justification for 
such a right in the context of a bench trial. This view rests on 
the premise that a judge, with legal training and experience, 
will be likely to see the cause clearly, rendering argument 
superfluous, or to recognize that further illumination of the 
issues would be helpful, in which case he would permit 
closing argument. 
We find this contention unpersuasive. Judicial training 
and expertise, however it may enhance judgment, does not 
render memory or reasoning infallible. Moreover, in one 
important respect, closing argument may be even more 
important in a bench trial than in a trial by jury. As 
Mr. Justice Powell has observed, the 'collective judgment' 
of the jury 'tends to compensate for individual shortcomings 
and furnishes some assurance of a reliable decision.' 
Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash & Lee L Rev 1, 4 (1966). 
In contrast, the judge who tries a case presumably will reach 
his verdict with deliberation and contemplation, but must reach 
it without the stimulation of opposing viewpoints inherent in the 
collegial decision making process of a jury...." 
The conviction, even though non-jury, was reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both parties in the case filed petitions. The case was tried before the court 
on both petitions on January 29, 1998. There was then a two month interval 
before the trial was completed on April 24, 1998. The court sua sponte indicated 
that it would rely upon its notes, and therefore no summation or closing argument 
would be allowed, nor was allowed. 
This action by the court deprived the parties of an essential function and 
duty to marshal the evidence and argue their theories of the case. The court 
immediately made oral findings from the bench. Plaintiff filed written objections, 
exceptions, and Memorandum of Authority; defendant filed reply memorandum. 
The court has never held a hearing on or settled the issues raised in the 
objections. This raises an issue on appeal as to whether or not the objection is 
a post-judgment motion, which can be treated either as a "motion to alter or 
amend judgment" or "motion for new trial;" however, the fact that no closing 
argument was allowed makes this question more significant in this particular 
case. Trial court may limit closing argument, but to deny it totally is error as a 
matter of law. 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
Relief requested is in the alternative as follows: 
1. Judgment be vacated and case remanded to the trial court to allow 
the parties to conduct closing argument and thereby marshal the 
evidence presented before the trial court prior to the court's entry 
of judgment; or in the alternative, 
2. Plaintiff's written objection to court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and judgment be treated as a post trial "Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment"upon which the plaintiff should be allowed 
hearing and argument and the case therefore be remanded to the 
trial court to decide said post trial motion prior to appeal. 
Dated this 1999. 
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules 
[Reproduced verbatim in addendum] 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Art. I, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Art. I, § 26 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless 
by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Art. I, § 27 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of 
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
History: Const 1896. 
[422 US 853] 
CLIFFORD HERRING, Appellant, 
v 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
422 US 853, 45 L Ed 2d 593, 95 S Ct 2550 
[No. 73-6587] 
Argued February 26, 1975. Decided June 30, 1975. 
SUMMARY 
At the close of the defendant's nonjury criminal trial in the Supreme 
Court of Richmond County, New York, the defense counsel's request to 
make a summation of the evidence before the rendition of the judgment was 
denied by the trial judge in reliance upon a New York statute which 
conferred upon the court in such a trial discretion to permit the parties to 
deliver summations. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court, Second Department, affirmed the conviction without opinion (43 App 
Div 2d 816, 351 NYS2d 368), and the New York Court of Appeals denied 
leave to appeal. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 
Appellate Division and remanded the case. In an opinion by STEWART, J., 
expressing the view of six members of the court, it was held that the Sixth 
Amendment's guaranty of assistance of counsel, applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated by the New York statute 
insofar as it conferred upon the trial judge in a nonjury criminal trial the 
power totally to deny counsel any opportunity to make a closing summation. 
REHNQUIST, J., joined by BURGER, Ch. J., and BLACKMUN, J., dissented on 
the ground that (1) a prophylactic rule with regard to summations in 
nonjury trials is inappropriate; and (2) the court's decision, reversing a 
criminal conviction which was fairly obtained, derives no support either 
from logic or from the Sixth Amendment. 
Briefs of Counsel, p 874, infra. 
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U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 45 L Ed 2d 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers' Edition 
Criminal Law § 46.6 — right to coun- tify accurately cases in which closing 
sel — denial of opportunity to argument may correct a premature mis-
closing summation judgment and avoid an otherwise erro-
la-ld. The Sixth Amendment's guar- neous verdict until the judge has heard 
anty of assistance of counsel, applicable the closing summation of counsel, 
to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is violated by a state Constitutional Law §37; Criminal 
court's denial, under the authority of a Law §§ 46, 46.5, 48, 50; Jury § 2; 
statute of the state, of any opportunity Witnesses § 4 — Sixth Amend-
for the defense to make a summation of ment — applicability to states 
the evidence before rendition of judg- 2. The Sixth Amendment's fundamen-
ment, since (1) closing argument for the tal rights of an accused—the rights to a 
defense is a basic element of the adver- "speedy and public trial," to an "impar-
sary factfinding process in a criminal tial jury," to notice of the "nature and 
trial; (2) there can be no justification for cause of the accusation," to be "con-
a statute that empowers a trial judge to fronted" with opposing witnesses, to 
deny absolutely the opportunity for any "compulsory process" for defense wit-
closing summation at all; and (3) there is nesses, and to the "assistance of counsel" 
no certain way for a trial judge to iden- are extended to a defendant in a state 
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES 
21 AM JUR 2d, Criminal Law §234; 75 AM JUR 2d, Trial 
§§ 191, 211 
6 AM JUR TRIALS 771, Nonjury Summations 
USCS, Constitution, 6th and 14th Amendments 
US L ED DIGEST, Criminal § 46.6; Trial § 31 
ALR DIGESTS, Criminal Law §§ 110 et seq.; Trial § 32 
L ED INDEX TO ANNOS, Criminal Law; Trial 
ALR QUICK INDEX, Argument of Counsel; Assistance of Coun-
sel 
FEDERAL QUICK INDEX, Assistance of Counsel; Closing Argu-
ment of Counsel 
ANNOTATION REFERENCES 
What provisions of the Federal Constitution's Bill of Rights are applicable to the 
states. 18 L Ed 2d 1388, 23 L Ed 2d 985. 
Accused's right to counsel under the Federal Constitution. 93 L Ed 137, 2 L Ed 
2d 1644, 9 L Ed 2d 1260, 18 L Ed 2d 1420. 
Prejudicial effect of trial court's denial, or equivalent, of counsel's rights to 
argue case. 38 ALR2d 1396. 
Propriety of court's limitation of time allowed counsel for summation or argu-
ment in criminal trial. 6 ALR3d 604. 
Right of defendant in criminal case to conduct defense in person, or to partici-
pate with counsel. 17 ALR 266, 77 ALR2d 1233. 
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HERRING v NEW YORK 
422 US 853, 45 L Ed 2d 593, 95 S a 2550 
criminal prosecution through the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
Constitutional Law § 10 — Sixth 
Amendment — liberal construc-
tion 
3. The Sixth Amendment rights of an 
accused are not given a narrowly literal-
istic construction by the Supreme Court. 
Criminal Law § 46.4 — right to coun-
sel — scope 
4. The right to the assistance of coun-
sel means that there can be no restric-
tions upon the function of counsel in 
defending a criminal prosecution in ac-
cord with the traditions of the adversary 
factfinding process that has been consti-
tutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments; this right has been given a 
meaning that ensures for the defense in 
a criminal trial the opportunity to par-
ticipate fully and fairly in the adversary 
factfinding process. 
Trial § 31 — by jury — defense — 
right to closing summation 
5. Counsel for the defense has a right 
to make a closing summation to the jury, 
no matter how strong the case for the 
prosecution may appear to the presiding 
judge. 
Criminal Law § 1 — adversary system 
6. The very premise of the American 
adversary system of criminal justice is 
that partisan advocacy on both sides of a 
case will best promote the ultimate ob-
jective that the guilty be convicted and 
the innocent go free. 
Trial § 31 — closing arguments — 
discretion of presiding judge 
7. The judge presiding at a criminal 
trial has broad discretion in controlling 
the duration and limiting the scope of 
closing summations; he may limit coun-
sel to a reasonable time and may termi-
nate argument when continuation would 
be repetitive or redundant, and he may 
ensure that argument does not stray 
unduly from the mark, or otherwise im-
pede the fair and orderly conduct of the 
trial. 
Trial § 31 — closing arguments — by 
defendant 
8a, 8b. A defendant in a criminal case 
who has exercised the right to conduct 
his own defense has the same right, as 
counsel for a defendant, to make a clos-
ing argument in a nonjury as well as in 
a jury trial. 
SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS 
A total denial of the opportunity for 
final summation in a nonjury criminal 
trial as well as in a jury trial deprives 
the accused of the basic right to make 
his defense, and a New York statute 
granting every judge in a nonjury crimi-
nal trial the power to deny such summa-
tion before rendition of judgment vio-
lates the Sixth Amendment of the Con-
stitution as applied against the States by 
the Fourteenth. 
43 App Div 2d 816, 351 NYS2d 368, 
vacated and remanded. 
Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of 
the Court, in which Douglas, Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. 
Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, 
JJ., joined, post, p 865, 45 L Ed 2d p 602. 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
Diana A. Steele argued the cause for appellant. 
Norman C. Morse and Gabriel I. Levy argued the cause for 
appellee. 
Briefs of Counsel, p 874, infra. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
[1a] A New York law confers upon 
every judge in a nonjury criminal 
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trial the power to deny counsel any 
opportunity to make a summation of 
the evidence before the rendition of 
judgment. NY Crim Proc Law 
§ 320.20 
[422 US 854] 
(3)(c) (1971).1 In the case 
before us we are called upon to as-
sess the constitutional validity of 
that law. 
I 
The appellant was brought to trial 
in the Supreme Court of Richmond 
County, NY, upon charges of at-
tempted robbery in the first and 
third degrees and possession of a 
dangerous instrument.2 He waived a 
jury. 
The trial began on a Thursday, 
and, after certain preliminaries, the 
balance of that day and most of 
Friday were spent on the case for 
the prosecution. The complaining 
witness, Allen Braxton, testified that 
the appellant had approached him 
1. Section 320.20(3)(c) provides: 
"The court may in its discretion permit the 
parties to deliver summations. If the court 
grants permission to one party, it must grant 
it to the other also. If both parties deliver 
summations, the defendant's summation must 
be delivered first." 
By contrast, New York law explicitly grants a 
right to make a "closing statement" in every 
civil case. NY Civ Prac Rule 4016 (1963). 
2. NY Penal Law §§ 110.00/160.15, 110.00/ 
160.05, 265.05 (1975). 
3. On cross-examination of Braxton, the 
appellant's lawyer demonstrated the following 
inconsistencies: First, Braxton testified at 
trial that, after running into his house to 
evade the appellant, he did not look back 
outside to see where the appellant had gone; 
but before the grand jury, Braxton had said 
that, after entering his house, he had looked 
outside and the appellant was gone. Second, 
Braxton testified at trial that the knifeblade 
was shiny; but in his grand jury testimony he 
had said that he could not remember if it was 
shiny or not. Third, Braxton testified at trial 
that the appellant had asked him for money 
outside his home in a Staten Island 
housing project at about six o'clock 
on the evening of September 15, 
1971, and asked for money. He said 
that when he refused this demand, 
the appellant had swung a knife at 
him. On cross-examination, the ap-
pellant's lawyer attempted to im-
peach the credibility of this evidence 
by demonstrating inconsistencies be-
tween Braxton's testimony and other 
sworn statements that Braxton had 
previously made.3 The only other 
[422 US 855] 
witness for the prosecution 
was the police officer who had ar-
rested the appellant upon the com-
plaint of Braxton. The officer testi-
fied that Braxton had reported the 
alleged incident to him, and that the 
appellant, when confronted by the 
officer later in the evening, had de-
nied Braxton's story and said that 
he had been working for a Mr. Tay-
lor at the time of the alleged offense. 
The officer testified that he had then 
arrested the appellant and found a 
small knife in his pocket.4 
in a "soft" voice; but before the grand jury he 
had stated that the request for money was 
"kind of loud." Fourth, Braxton testified at 
trial that the appellant had swung a blade at 
him once; but in the felony complaint filed 
the day after the alleged crime, he had stated 
that the appellant had swung a knife at him 
"a couple of times." 
4. There was a major inconsistency between 
the police officer's testimony and that of Brax-
ton. Braxton testified that he was walking 
down the street with the officer at about 6:45 
p.m. when they came across the appellant. 
But the officer testified that he had searched 
for the appellant with Braxton until only 
about 6:30 p.m., when they had separated, 
and that about an hour later he had seen the 
appellant and Braxton on opposite sides of 
Broadway. Thus Braxton testified that he and 
the officer were together when they found the 
appellant about 6:45 p.m., while the officer's 
testimony was that he had separated from 
Braxton about 6:30 p.m., and that he next 
saw Braxton and the appellant on opposite 
sides of a street at about 7:30 p.m. 
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At the close of the case for the 
prosecution, the court granted a de-
fense motion to dismiss the charge of 
possession of a dangerous instru-
ment on the ground that the knife 
in evidence was too small to qualify 
as a dangerous instrument under 
state law. The trial was then ad-
journed for the two-day weekend. 
Proceedings did not actually re-
sume until the following Monday 
afternoon. The first witness for the 
defense 
[422 US 856] 
was Donald Taylor, who was 
the appellant's employer. He testi-
fied that he recalled seeing the ap-
pellant on the job premises at about 
5:30 p. m. on the day of the alleged 
offense. The appellant then took the 
stand and denied Braxton's story. 
He said that he had been working 
on a refrigerator at his place of em-
ployment during the time of the 
alleged offense, and further testified 
that Braxton, a former neighbor, 
had threatened on several occasions 
to "fix" him for refusing to give 
Braxton money for wine and drugs. 
At the conclusion of the case for 
the defense, counsel made a motion 
to dismiss the robbery charges. This 
motion was denied. The appellant's 
lawyer then requested to "be heard 
somewhat on the facts." The trial 
5. The court subsequently certified that in 
affirming the judgment, it had rejected the 
appellant's constitutional claims: 
"Upon the appeal herein, there was pre-
sented and passed upon the following consti-
tutional question, namely, whether relator's 
rights under the Fourth, Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments were denied by the trial 
court's application of paragraph (c) of subdivi-
sion 3 of CPL 320.20 to refuse appellant per-
mission to deliver a summation. This court 
considered appellant's said conviction and de-
termined that none of his constitutional 
rights were violated." 
6. The Sixth Amendment provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
NEW YORK 
2d 593, 95 S Ct 2550 
judge replied: "Under the new stat-
ute, summation is discretionary, and 
I choose not to hear summations." 
The judge thereupon found the ap-
pellant guilty of attempted robbery 
in the third degree, and subse-
quently sentenced him to serve an 
indeterminate term of imprisonment 
with a maximum of four years. The 
conviction was affirmed without 
opinion by an intermediate appellate 
court.5 Leave to appeal to the New 
York Court of Appeals was denied. 
An appeal was then brought here, 
and we noted probable jurisdiction. 
419 US 893, 42 L Ed 2d 137, 95 S Ct 
171. 
II 
[1b, 2] The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees to the accused in all 
criminal prosecutions the rights to a 
"speedy and 
[422 US 857] 
public trial." to an "im-
partial jury," to notice of the "na-
ture and cause of the accusation," to 
be "confronted" with opposing wit-
nesses, to "compulsory process" for 
defense witnesses, and to the "As-
sistance of Counsel."6 These funda-
mental rights are extended to a de-
fendant in a state criminal prosecu-
tion through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.7 
trial, by an impartial jury . . .[,] to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
7. See Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 
213, 18 L Ed 2d 1, 87 S Ct 988 (speedy trial); 
In re Oliver, 333 US 257, 92 L Ed 682, 68 S a 
499 (public trial); Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 
145, 20 L Ed 2d 491, 88 S Ct 1444 (jury trial); 
Cole v Arkansas, 333 US 196, 92 L Ed 644, 68 
S Ct 514 (notice of nature and cause of accu-
sation); Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 13 L Ed 
2d 923, 85 S Ct 1065 (confrontation); Washing-
ton v Texas, 388 US 14, 18 L Ed 2d 1019, 87 S 
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[3, 4] The decisions of this Court 
have not given to these constitu-
tional provisions a narrowly literal-
istic construction. More specifically, 
the right to the assistance of counsel 
has been understood to mean that 
there can be no restrictions upon the 
function of counsel in defending a 
criminal prosecution in accord with 
the traditions of the adversary fact-
finding process that has been consti-
tutionalized in the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. For example, 
in Ferguson v Georgia, 365 US 570, 
5 L Ed 2d 783, 81 S Ct 756, the 
Court held constitutionally invalid a 
state statute that, while permitting 
the defendant to make an unsworn 
statement to the court and jury, pre-
vented defense counsel from eliciting 
the defendant's testimony through 
direct examination. Similarly, in 
Brooks v Tennessee, 406 US 605, 32 
L Ed 2d 358, 92 S Ct 1891, the Court 
found unconstitutional a state law 
[422 US 858] 
that restricted the right of counsel 
to decide "whether, and when in the 
Ct 1920 (compulsory process); Gideon v Wain-
wright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 
792, 93 ALR2d 733, and Argersinger v Ham-
lin, 407 US 25, 32 L Ed 2d 530, 92 S Ct 2006 
(assistance of counsel). 
8. See, e.g., Jackson v State, 239 Ala 38, 193 
So 417 (1940); Yeldell v State, 100 Ala 26, 14 
So 570 (1894); People v Green, 99 Cal 564, 34 
P 231 (1893); State v Hoyt, 47 Conn 518 
(1880); Hall v State, 119 Fla 38, 160 So 511 
(1935); Williams v State, 60 Ga 367 (1878); 
Porter v State, 6 Ga App 770, 65 SE 814 
(1909); State v Gilbert, 65 Idaho 210, 142 P2d 
584 (1943); People v McMullen, 300 111 383, 
133 NE 328 (1921); Lynch v State, 9 Ind 541 
(1857); State v Verry, 36 Kan 416, 13 P 838 
(1887); Sizemore v Commonwealth, 240 Ky 
279, 42 SW2d 328 (1931); State v Cancienne, 
50 La Ann 1324, 24 So 321 (1898); Wingo v 
State, 62 Miss 311 (1884); State v Page, 21 Mo 
257 (1855); State v Tighe, 27 Mont 327, 71 P 3 
(1903); State v Shedoudy, 45 NM 516, 118 P2d 
280 (1941); People v Marcelin, 23 App Div 2d 
368, 260 NYS2d 560 (1965); State v Hardy, 
189 NC 799, 128 SE 152 (1925); Weaver v 
course of presenting his defense, the 
accused should take the stand." Id., 
at 613, 32 L Ed 2d 358, 92 S Ct 1891. 
The right to the assistance of coun-
sel has thus been given a meaning 
that ensures to the defense in a 
criminal trial the opportunity to 
participate fully and fairly in the 
adversary factfinding process. 
[1c, 5] There can be no doubt that 
closing argument for the defense is a 
basic element of the adversary fact-
finding process in a criminal trial. 
Accordingly, it has universally been 
held that counsel for the defense has 
a right to make a closing summation 
to the jury, no matter how strong 
the case for the prosecution may 
appear to the presiding judge.8 The 
issue has been considered less often 
[422 US 859] 
in the context of a so-called bench 
trial. But the overwhelming weight 
of authority, in both federal and 
state courts, holds that a total denial 
of the opportunity for final argu-
ment in a nonjury criminal trial is a 
denial of the basic right of the ac-
cused to make his defense.9 
State, 24 Ohio St 584 (1874); State v Rogoway, 
45 Ore 601, 78 P 987 (1904), rehearing, 45 Ore 
611, 81 P 234 (1905); Stewart v Common-
wealth, 117 Pa 378, 11 A 370 (1887); State v 
Ballenger, 202 SC 155, 24 SE2d 175 (1943); 
Word v Commonwealth, 30 Va 743 (1831); 
State v Mayo, 42 Wash 540, 85 P 251 (1906); 
Seattle v Erickson, 55 Wash 675, 104 P 1128 
(1909). 
One treatise states the general rule as fol-
lows: "The presentation of his defense by 
argument to the jury, by himself or his coun-
sel, is a constitutional right of the defendant 
which may not be denied him, however clear 
the evidence may seem to the trial court." 5 
R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and 
Procedure § 2077 (1957). 
9. See United States v Walls, 443 F2d 1220 
(CA6 1971); Thomas v District of Columbia, 67 
App DC 179, 90 F2d 424 (1937); United States 
ex rel. Spears v Johnson, 327 F Supp 1021 
(ED Pa 1971), revd on other grounds, 463 F2d 
1024 (CA3 1972); United States ex rel. Wilcox 
v Pennsylvania, 273 F Supp 923 (ED Pa 1967); 
Floyd v State, 90 So 2d 105 (Fla 1956); Olds v 
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One of many cases so holding was 
Yopps v State, 228 Md 204, 178 A2d 
879 (1962). The defendant in that 
case, indicted for burglary, was tried 
by the court without a jury. The 
defendant in his testimony admitted 
being in the vicinity of the offense, 
but denied any involvement in the 
crime. At the conclusion of the testi-
mony, the trial judge announced a 
judgment of guilty. Defense counsel 
objected, stating that he wished to 
present argument on the facts. But 
the trial judge refused to hear any 
argument on the ground that only a 
question of credibility 
[422 US 860] 
was involved, 
and that therefore counsel's argu-
ment would not change his mind. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court's refusal to per-
mit defense counsel to make a final 
summation violated the defendant's 
right to the assistance of counsel 
under the State and Federal Consti-
tutions: 
"The Constitutional right of a 
defendant to be heard through 
counsel necessarily includes his 
right to have his counsel make a 
proper argument on the evidence 
and the applicable law in his fa-
vor, however simple, clear, unim-
Commonwealth, 10 Ky 465 (1821); Yopps v 
State, 228 Md 204, 178 A2d 879 (1962); People 
v Thomas, 390 Mich 93, 210 NW2d 776 (1973); 
Decker v State, 113 Ohio St 512, 150 NE 74 
(1925); Commonwealth v McNair, 208 Pa Su-
per 369, 222 A2d 599 (1966); Commonwealth v 
Gambrell, 450 Pa 290, 301 A2d 596 (1973); 
Anselin v State, 72 Tex Cr 17, 160 SW 713 
(1913); Walker v State, 133 Tex Cr 300, 110 
SW2d 578 (1937); Ferguson v State, 133 Tex 
Cr 250, 110 SW2d 61 (1937). Cf. Collingsworth 
v Mayo, 173 F2d 695, 697 (CA5 1949); State v 
Hollingsworth, 160 La 26, 106 So 662 (1925). 
But see People v Manske, 399 111 176, 77 
NE2d 164 (1948). Cf. People v Berger, 288 111 
47, 119 NE 975 (1918); Casterlow v State, 256 
peached, and conclusive the evi-
dence may seem, unless he has 
waived his right to such argu-
ment, or unless the argument is 
not within the issues in the case, 
and the trial court has no discre-
tion to deny the accused such 
right." Id., at 207, 178 A2d, at 881. 
The widespread recognition of the 
right of the defense to make a clos-
ing summary of the evidence to the 
trier of the facts, whether judge or 
jury, finds solid support in history. 
In the 16th and 17th centuries, 
when notions of compulsory process, 
confrontation, and counsel were in 
their infancy, the essence of the 
English criminal trial was argument 
between the defendant and counsel 
for the Crown. Whatever other pro-
cedural protections may have been 
lacking, there was no absence of 
debate on the factual and legal is-
sues raised in a criminal case.10 As 
the rights to compulsory process, to 
confrontation, and to counsel devel-
oped,11 the adversary system's com-
mitment 
[422 US 861] 
to argument was neither 
discarded nor diluted. Rather, the 
reform in procedure had the effect of 
shifting the primary function of ar-
gument to summation of the evi-
Ind 214, 267 NE2d 552 (1971); Reed v State, 
232 Ind 68, 111 NE2d 661 (1953); Lewis v 
State, 11 Ga App 14, 74 SE 442 (1912). 
10. Stephen has described the trial proce-
dure in this period as a "long argument be-
tween the prisoner and the counsel for the 
Crown." 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal 
Law of England, 326 (1883). For a fuller de-
scription of the trial process in that period, 
see id., at 325-326, 350. 
11. See 7 Will 3, c 3, § 1 (1695); 1 Anne, Stat 
2, c 9, § 3 (1701); 6 and 7 Will 4, c 114, § 1 
(1836). 
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dence at the close of trial, in con-
trast to the "fragmented" factual 
argument that had been typical of 
the earlier common law.12 
[422 US 862] 
It can hardly be questioned that 
closing argument serves to sharpen 
and clarify the issues for resolution 
by the trier of fact in a criminal 
case. For it is only after all the 
evidence is in that counsel for the 
parties are in a position to present 
their respective versions of the case 
as a whole. Only then can they ar-
gue the inferences to be drawn from 
all the testimony, and point out the 
weaknesses of their adversaries' po-
sitions. And for the defense, closing 
argument is the last clear chance to 
persuade the trier of fact that there 
may be reasonable doubt of the de-
fendant's guilt. See In re Winship, 
397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 90 S Ct 
1068. 
[6] The very premise of our adver-
sary system of criminal justice is 
that partisan advocacy on both sides 
of a case will best promote the ulti-
12. Cf. Stephen, supra, n 10, at 349. 
In the Colonies, where a similar reform in 
criminal defendants' righto occurred, common 
practice, if not right, apparently gave to the 
accused the opportunity to sum up his case in 
closing argument. For example, Zephaniah 
Swift, in an early colonial treatise on the law 
in Connecticut, wrote: 
"When the exhibition of evidence is closed, 
the attorney for the state opens the argu-
ment, the counsel for the prisoner follow[s], 
the attorney for the state then closes the 
argument, and the chief justice then sums up 
the evidence in his charge delivered to the 
jury, in which he states in the most candid 
and impartial manner, the evidence and the 
law, and the arguments of the counsel for the 
state, as well as the prisoner. . . . " 2 Z. Swift, 
A System of the Laws of the State of Connect-
icut 401 (1796). 
With a lesser degree of certainty, a modern 
scholar concludes that in the trial of capital 
offenses in colonial Virginia, it was likely, but 
not certain, that the accused would be given 
mate objective that the guilty be 
convicted and the innocent go free. 
In a criminal trial, which is in the 
end basically a factfinding process, 
no aspect of such advocacy could be 
more important than the opportu-
nity finally to marshal the evidence 
for each side before submission of 
the case to judgment. 
[7] This is not to say that closing 
arguments in a criminal case must 
be uncontrolled or even unres-
trained. The presiding judge must be 
and is given great latitude in con-
trolling the duration and limiting 
the scope of closing summations. He 
may limit counsel to a reasonable 
time and may terminate argument 
when continuation would be repeti-
tive or redundant. He may ensure 
that argument does not stray unduly 
from the mark, or otherwise impede 
the fair and orderly conduct of the 
trial. In all these respects he must 
have broad discretion. See generally 
5 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal 
Law and Procedure § 2077 (1957). Cf. 
American Bar Association Project on 
Standards for Criminal Justice, 
an opportunity to make a closing argument in 
summation at the end of the trial. See H. 
Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the 
General Court of Colonial Virginia 101 (1965). 
In England, in 1865, the right of the defend-
ant in a criminal trial to make a closing 
argument, either by himself or by counsel if 
he was represented, was given express statu-
tory recognition: "[U]pon every Trial . . . 
whether the Prisoners . . . or any of them, 
shall be defended by Counsel or not . . . such 
Prisoner . . . shall be entitled . . . when all 
the Evidence is concluded to sum up the 
Evidence respectively." Criminal Procedure 
Act of 1865, 28 Vict, c 18, § 2. This remains 
the rule in England. 10 Halsbury's Laws of 
England, § 777, pp 422-423 (3d ed 1955). See 
also T. Butler & M. Garsia, Archibold's, 
Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal 
Cases, §558 (37th ed 1969). Cf. R. v Wain-
right, 13 Cox Cr Cases 171 (1875); R. v Wick-
ham 55 Cr App R 199 (1971) (noted at 1971 
Crim L Rev 233). 
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The Prosecution Function §5.8, pp 
126-129, and the Defense Function, 
§ 7.8, pp 277-282 (App Draft 1971). 
[422 US 863] 
[1d] But there can be no justifica-
tion for a statute that empowers a 
trial judge to deny absolutely the 
opportunity for any closing summa-
tion at all. The only conceivable in-
terest served by such a statute is 
expediency. Yet the difference in 
any case between total denial of 
final argument and a concise but 
persuasive summation could spell 
the difference, for the defendant, be-
tween liberty and unjust imprison-
ment.13 
Some cases may appear to the 
trial judge to be simple—open and 
shut—at the close of the evidence. 
And surely in many such cases a 
closing argument will, in the words 
of Mr. Justice Jackson, be "likely to 
leave [a] judge just where it found 
him."14 But just as surely, there will 
be cases where closing argument 
may correct a premature misjudg-
ment and avoid an otherwise erro-
neous verdict. And there is no cer-
13. We deal in this case only with final 
argument or summation at the conclusion of 
the evidence in a criminal trial. Nothing said 
in this opinion is to be understood as imply-
ing the existence of a constitutional right to 
oral argument at any other stage of the trial 
or appellate process. 
14. R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial 
Supremacy, 301 (1941). 
15. The contention has been made that, 
while a right to make closing argument 
should be recognized in a jury trial, there is 
insufficient justification for such a right in the 
context of a bench trial. This view rests on 
the premise that a judge, with legal training 
and experience, will be likely to see the case 
clearly, rendering argument superfluous, or to 
recognize that further illumination of the 
issues would be helpful, in which case he 
would permit closing argument. 
tain way for a trial judge to identify 
accurately which cases these will be, 
until the judge has heard the closing 
summation of counsel.15 
[422 US 864] 
[8a] The present case is illustra-
tive. This three-day trial was inter-
rupted by an interval of more than 
two days—a period during which the 
judge's memory may well have dim-
med, however conscientious a note-
taker he may have been. At the 
conclusion of the evidence on the 
triaPs final day, the appellant's law-
yer might usefully have pointed to 
the direct conflict in the trial testi-
mony of the only two prosecution 
witnesses concerning how and when 
the appellant was found on the eve-
ning of the alleged offense.18 He 
might also have stressed the many 
inconsistencies, elicited on cross-ex-
amination, between the trial testi-
mony of the complaining witness 
and his earlier sworn statements.17 
He might reasonably have argued 
that the testimony of the appellant's 
employer was entitled to greater 
credibility than that of the com-
plaining witness, who, according to 
We find this contention unpersuasive. Judi-
cial training and expertise, however it may 
enhance judgment, does not render memory 
or reasoning infallible. Moreover, in one im-
portant respect, closing argument may be 
even more important in a bench trial than in 
a trial by jury. As Mr. Justice Powell has 
observed, the "collective judgment" of the 
jury "tends to compensate for individual 
shortcomings and furnishes some assurance of 
a reliable decision." Powell, Jury Trial of 
Crimes, 23 Wash & Lee L Rev 1, 4 (1966). In 
contrast, the judge who tries a case presuma-
bly will reach his verdict with deliberation 
and contemplation, but must reach it without 
the stimulation of opposing viewpoints inher-
ent in the collegial decisionmaking process of 
a jury. 
16. See n 4, supra. 
17. See n 3, supra. 
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the appellant, had threatened to 
"fix" him because of personal differ-
ences in the past. There is no way to 
know whether these or any other 
appropriate arguments in summa-
tion might have affected the ulti-
mate judgment in this case. The 
credibility assessment was solely for 
the trier of fact. But before that 
determination was made, the appel-
lant, through counsel, had a right to 
be heard in summation of the evi-
dence from the point of view most 
favorable to him.18 
[422 US 865] 
[1c] In denying the appellant this 
right under the authority of its stat-
ute, New York denied him the as-
sistance of counsel that the Constitu-
tion guarantees. Accordingly, the 
judgment before us is vacated and 
the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
SEPARATE OPINION 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with 
whom The Chief Justice and Mr. 
Justice BlaciJtnun join, dissenting. 
I 
The Court has made of this a very 
curious case. What began as a con-
stitutional challenge to a statute 
which gives trial courts discretion as 
to whether "parties" may deliver 
summations, has been transformed 
into an exploration of the right to 
counsel—although no one doubts 
that appellant was competently rep-
resented throughout the proceedings 
which resulted in his conviction. To-
day's opinion, in deriving from the 
right to counsel further rights relat-
ing to the conduct of a trial, expands 
the earlier holdings in Ferguson v 
Georgia, 365 US 570, 5 L Ed 2d 783, 
81 S Ct 756 (1961), and Brooks v 
Tennessee, 406 US 605, 32 L Ed 2d 
358, 92 S Ct'1891 (1972). In each of 
these three instances one must pre-
sume, in view of the Court's analyti-
cal approach, that regardless of the 
intrinsic importance of the rights 
involved, they are enforced only be-
cause the accused has a prior right 
to the assistance of a third party in 
the preparation and presentation of 
his defense. 
I think that in each instance a 
statement from Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's separate opinion in Fergu-
son is apropos: "This is not a right-
to-counsel case." 365 US, at 599, 5 L 
Ed 2d 783, 81 S Ct 756. In the pres-
ent case, the crucial fact is not that 
counsel wishes to present a summa-
tion of the evidence, but that the 
defendant—whether through counsel 
or otherwise—wishes to make such a 
summation. Of course 
[422 u s see] 
I do not sug-
gest that the rights enforced in these 
cases are without basis, at least in 
particular cases, in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Cf. id., at 598-601, 5 L Ed 2d 
783, 81 S Ct 756 (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.); Brooks v Tennessee, su-
pra, at 618, 32 L Ed 2d 358, 92 S Ct 
1891 (Eehnquist, J., dissenting). But 
I do suggest that the Court's analyti-
cal framework, and its result-
18. [8b] A defendant who has exercised the 
right to conduct his own defense has, of 
course, the same right to make a closing 
argument. See Faretta v California, ante, p 
806, 45 L Ed 2d 562, 95 S a 2525. 
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ing prophylactic rule, are wrongly 
employed to decide this case. 
I would have thought that in Far-
etta v California, ante, p 806, 45 L 
Ed 2d 562, 95 S Ct 2525, the Court 
had recanted its approach in Fergu-
son and Brooks v Tennessee. In Far-
etta the Court concluded that it is 
the Sixth Amendment, and not the 
Right-to-Counsel Clause of that 
Amendment, which "constitutional-
izes the right in an adversary crimi-
nal trial to make a defense as we 
know it." Ante, at 818, 45 L Ed 2d 
562, 95 S Ct 2525. Yet in the present 
case we are informed that it is the 
Right-to-Counsel Clause which con-
stitutionalizes the right to present a 
defense "in accord with the tradi-
tions of the adversary factfinding 
process." Ante, at 857, 45 L Ed 2d 
598. Not being content merely to 
contradict Faretta by holding that 
entitlement to the traditions of our 
judicial system depends upon the 
right to retain counsel, the Court 
also states that, "of course, the same 
right to make a closing argument" is 
available to those who choose not to 
exercise their right to counsel. Ante, 
at 864 n 18, 45 L Ed 2d 602. To 
complete the confusion, the Court 
does not explain the latter ipse dixit, 
but does cite one case—Faretta. 
n 
The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has long 
been recognized as assuring "funda-
mental fairness" in state criminal 
proceedings. See, e.g., Lisenba v Cali-
fornia, 314 US 219, 236, 86 L Ed 
166, 62 S Ct 280 (1941); Moore v 
Dempsey, 261 US 86, 90-91, 67 L Ed 
543, 43 S Ct 265 (1923). Throughout 
the history of the Clause we have 
generally considered the question of 
[422 US 867] 
fairness on a case-by-case basis, re-
NEW YORK 
2d 593, 95 S a 2550 
fleeting the fact that the elements of 
fairness vary with the circumstances 
of particular proceedings. As the 
Court observed in Snyder v Massa-
chusetts, 291 US 97, 116-117, 78 L 
Ed 674, 54 S Ct 330, 90 ALR 575 
(1934): 
"Due process of law requires that 
the proceedings shall be fair, but 
fairness is a relative, not an abso-
lute concept. . . . What is fair in 
one set of circumstances may be 
an act of tyranny in others." 
See, e.g., Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 
US 333, 16 L Ed 2d 600, 86 S Ct 
1507 (1966); Spencer v Texas, 385 
US 554, 17 L Ed 2d 606, 87 S Ct 648 
(1967); Chambers v Mississippi, 410 
US 284, 35 L Ed 2d 297, 93 S Ct 
1038 (1973); Cupp v Naughten, 414 
US 141, 38 L Ed 2d 368, 94 S Ct 396 
(1973). 
However in some instances the 
Court has engaged in a process of 
"specific incorporation," whereby 
certain provisions of the Bill of 
Rights have been applied against the 
States. See the cases cited ante, at 
857 n 7, 45 L Ed 2d 597. In making 
the decision whether or not a partic-
ular provision relating to the con-
duct of a trial should be incorpo-
rated, we have been guided by 
whether the right in question may 
be deemed essential to fundamental 
fairness—an analytical approach 
which is compelled if we are to re-
main true to the basic orientation of 
the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., In 
re Oliver, 333 US 257, 270-271, 92 L 
Ed 682, 68 S Ct 499 (1948) (public 
trial); Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 
145, 155-158, 20 L Ed 2d 491, 88 S 
Ct 1444 (1968) (jury trial); Pointer v 
Texas, 380 US 400, 403-404, 13 L Ed 
2d 923, 85 S Ct 1065 (1965) (confron-
tation); Washington v Texas, 388 US 
14, 17-19, 18 L Ed 2d 1019, 87 S a 
603 
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1920 (1967) (compulsory process); 
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 
342, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 93 
ALR3d 733 (1963) (appointed coun-
sel). But once we have determined 
that a particular right should be 
incorporated against the States, we 
have abandoned case-by-case consid-
erations of fairness. Incorporation, 
in effect, results in the establish-
ment of a strict prophylactic rule, 
one which is to be generally ob-
served in every case regardless of its 
particular circumstances. It is a 
judgment on the part of 
[422 US 868] 
this Court 
that the probability of unfairness in 
the absence of a particular right is 
so great that denigration of the right 
will not be countenanced under any 
circumstances. These judgments by 
this Court reflect similar judgments 
made by the Constitution's Framers 
with regard to the Federal Govern-
ment. 
Beyond certain of the specified 
rights in the Bill of Rights, however, 
I do not understand the basis for 
abandoning the case-by-case ap-
proach to fundamental fairness. 
There are a myriad of rules and 
practices governing the conduct of 
criminal proceedings which may or 
may not in particular circumstances 
be necessary to assure fundamental 
fairness. Obvious examples are the 
rules governing the introduction and 
testing of evidence, as well as, I 
think, the New York rule governing 
summations in nonjury trials. Such 
matters are not specifically dealt 
with in the text of the Constitution, 
nor are they subject to the judgment 
that uniform application of a partic-
ular rule is necessary because the 
1. The employer's credibility was not at 
issue. Not only was he vague as to the times 
at which he had seen appellant at his garage, 
likelihood of unfairness is too great 
when that rule is not observed. As to 
such matters it is appropriate, and 
frequently necessary, that trial 
judges be accorded considerable dis-
cretion, subject of course to both 
appellate review on an abuse-of-dis-
cretion standard and, ultimately, to 
the fundamental fairness inquiry un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The present case is a prime exam-
ple of why a prophylactic rule with 
regard to summations in nonjury 
trials is thoroughly inappropriate. 
The case was tried before a judge 
who, unlike a jury, may take notes 
on testimony, and who is experi-
enced in both judging the credibility 
of witnesses and testing the rele-
vance of their testimony to the ele-
ments which must be proved to ob-
tain a conviction. The case was con-
ceptually and factually a simple one, 
involving no more than whether one 
was 
[422 US 869] 
to believe the victim, despite the 
inconsistencies in his testimony, or 
the defendant.1 The judge had previ-
ously permitted appellant's counsel 
to summarize the evidence, on the 
occasion of the motion to dismiss at 
the close of the State's case. That 
appellant's counsel had considerable 
faith in the judge's familiarity with, 
and ability to organize, the evidence 
is shown by the transcript of that 
earlier summation: 
"[MR. ADAMS:] Do you want to 
hear me extensively on that, 
Judge? Or I have a witness here, I 
can go on, or would you rather 
hear me on some lengthy argu-
ment subsequently, Judge? 
"THE COURT: I will hear any-
thing you have to say. 
but that garage was located only 3V6 blocks 
from the scene of the crime. App 76, 86. 
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"MR. ADAMS: All right. Judge, 
I believe here that as a matter of 
law we have a doubt here. Firstly, 
on this first witness of the prosecu-
tion here, Judge. There were nu-
merous inconsistencies, and / will 
not bore the Court reading that 
Of course the Court has copious 
notes on it, and I am sure it is 
very fresh in the Court's mind. 
But on top of that, Judge, we have 
a questionable complainant, with 
a questionable way of how it hap-
pened, no witness other than this 
complainant. 
"An officer who checked out this 
particular matter testified here 
and said that the man was work-
ing at that time. A definite denial 
by the defendant. And I believe 
that as a matter of law, Judge, 
there is a reasonable doubt here." 
App 66 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, when the opportunity to 
summarize was 
[422 US 870] 
denied, appellant's 
counsel did not so much as suggest 
that he thought it necessary to re-
fresh the judge's memory as to cer-
tain matters.2 It should also be noted 
that in his earlier argument counsel 
had referred to most of the matters 
which the Court today suggests 
might have usefully been brought to 
the judge's attention in a final sum-
mation. See ante, at 864, 45 L Ed 2d 
602. Finally, the fact that the judge 
2. The colloquy at the end of the trial was 
as follows: 
"MR. ADAMS: Judge, at this time I respect-
fully move to—make two motions, Judge. 
Firstly, that the Court dismiss the two counts, 
first count and the second count of the indict-
ment on the grounds the People have failed to 
make out a prima facie case; and on the 
further grounds the People have failed to 
prove the defendant guilty of each and every 
part and parcel of the crimes charged in 
count one and count two beyond a reasonable 
NEW YORK 
2d 593, 95 S a 2550 
conducted this trial in a fair-minded 
fashion, and would not arbitrarily 
prevent a summation which could be 
expected to clarify his understanding 
of the case, is evidenced by his dis-
missal of one count over the vigor-
ous protests of the prosecution. 
Whatever theoretical effect the de-
nial of argument may have had on 
the judgment of conviction, its prac-
tical effect on the outcome must 
have been close to nothing. The trial 
judge was not conducting a moot 
court; he was sitting as the finder of 
fact in a trial in which he had been 
present during the testimony of ev-
ery single witness. No experienced 
advocate would insist on presenting 
argument to such a judge after he 
had indicated his belief that argu-
ment would not be of assistance. 
Trial counsel here did not insist, and 
the claim which 
[422 US 871] 
is today sustained 
by this Court is urged by other coun-
sel. 
The truth of the matter is that 
appellant received a fair trial, and I 
do not read the Court's opinion to 
claim otherwise. The opinion instead 
establishes a right to summation in 
criminal trials regardless of circum-
stances, by tagging that right onto 
one of the specifically incorporated 
rights. It thereby conveniently 
avoids the difficulties of being unable 
doubt as a matter of law, and as a matter of 
fact. 
"THE COURT: Motion denied. I will take a 
short recess to deliberate, and I will give you 
a verdict. 
"MR. ADAMS: Well, can I be heard some-
what on the facts? 
"THE COURT: Under the new statute, sum-
mation is discretionary, and I choose not to 
hear summations. 
"THE CLERK: Remand." App 92. 
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to characterize appellant's trial as 
fundamentally unfair, but only at 
the expense of ignoring the logical 
difficulty of adorning the specifically 
incorporated rights with characteris-
tics which are not themselves neces-
sary for fundamental fairness.3 
The nature of the right which the 
Court today creates is as curious as 
its genesis. Apparently it requires 
nothing more than pro forma observ-
ance, since the trial judge "must be 
and is given great latitude" in con-
trolling the duration and limiting 
the scope of closing summations. He 
may determine what is a "reasona-
ble" time for argument, and at what 
point the argument becomes repeti-
tive or redundant, or strays "un-
duly" from the mark. "In all these 
respects he must have broad discre-
tion." Ante, at 862, 45 L Ed 2d 600. 
That is, after 30 seconds, or some 
other minimal period of argument, 
the judge is free to exercise his dis-
cretion. It is not clear why this 
should be so. If it is 
[422 US 872] 
true that "there 
is no certain way for a trial judge to 
identify accurately [those cases in 
which closing argument may be ben-
eficial], until the judge has heard the 
closing summation of counsel," ante, 
at 863, 45 L Ed 2d 601, it is equally 
true that he cannot determine 
whether continued argument will be 
3. While the Court, ante, at 862, 45 L Ed 2d 
600, presents a variety of arguments support-
ing the wisdom and desirability of generally 
permitting closing arguments in nonjury tri-
als, none of them impress me as rising to the 
level of fundamental fairness. They would be 
of substantial merit if presented to the New 
York Legislature, but are hardly relevant to 
the constitutional inquiry which it is our duty 
to perform. As for the Court's final flourish 
("no aspect of such advocacy could be more 
important"), it is obvious hyperbole which can 
repetitive, redundant, or otherwise 
useless until he has heard the con-
tinued argument. But in any event, 
the constitutional issue does rather 
quickly become framed once again 
according to the standards which 
should have governed all along— 
whether or not the judge's actions in 
the particular case deprived the de-
fendant of a trial which was funda-
mentally fair.4 
By propagating a right to summa-
tion—despite such a right's lack of 
textual basis, and despite the inabil-
ity reasonably to conclude that the 
right is so basic that we cannot 
chance trial court discretion in the 
matter—the Court has furthered the 
practice of reviewing state criminal 
trials in a piecemeal fashion. The 
incident upon which this reversal is 
based was but one stage in a care-
fully conducted trial, and cannot be 
claimed to have permeated the en-
tire proceeding as would trial with-
out a jury, or without counsel. The 
Court is thus disregarding the basic 
question of whether the proceeding 
by which a defendant is deprived of 
his liberty is fundamentally fair. 
The Court's decision derives no 
support either from logic or from the 
Amendment it professes to apply. 
Since it reverses a criminal convic-
tion which was fairly obtained, I 
dissent. 
only be uttered in complete disregard of such 
matters as cross-examination, the selection of 
trial strategy and witnesses, and attempts to 
exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 
4. I would also think it not unlikely under 
the Court's holding that post-trial briefing 
would be an adequate substitute for oral sum-
mation, since it meets the concerns which the 
Court expresses as the basis for its newly 
found constitutional right. See ante, at 862, 
45 L Ed 2d 600. 
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Charles JOSEPH, for himself and as Guard-
ian ad litem for his children, Tamara Lee 
and Melanie, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
W. H. GROVES LATTER DAY SAINTS 
HOSPITAL, a corporation, and Dr. J. H. 
Carlquist, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 8557. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 26, 1957. 
Action for death of deceased on alleged 
ground that hospital had negligently ad-
ministered a transfusion of incompatible 
blood bringing on a kidney infection and 
proximately causing death. Judgment for 
defendants in the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Martin M. Larson, J., and 
the plaintiff appeals. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that exclusion of entries 
by doctors in hospital record was prejudi-
cial error and that a nurse was entitled to 
testify that the deceased had received good 
nursing care in the hospital. 
Remanded for a new trial. 
McDonough, C. J., and Henriod, J., 
dissented. 
1. Evidence C=>35l 
In action for death of deceased on 
ground that hospital had negligently ad-
ministered a transfusion of incompatible 
blood which brought on a kidney infection 
proximately causing death, notations re-
corded by doctors on hospital records with 
information deemed pertinent to the care 
and treatment by persons performing duties 
in that regard, were admissible notwith-
standing that the notations represented in 
part the doctors' opinions as to the patient's 
condition.1 
2. Appeal and Error <§=>I027 
The Supreme Court does not reverse 
a case merely because of error, and will 
i. In re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 
297 P.2d 542. 
2. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 
2d 834; Bowden v. Denver & R. G. W. 
do so only when it appears to be prejudicial 
to the rights of a party, but such mandate 
does not authorize the court to ignore errors 
that may have a substantial effect upon an 
an outcome of the trial. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 61.2 
3. Appeal and Error <S=>I027 
If an error appears to be of such nature 
that it can be stated with assurance that it 
was of no material consequence in its ef-
fect upon the trial, because reasonable 
minds would have arrived at the same re-
sult, regardless thereof, the error would be 
harmless and the granting of a new trial 
would not be warranted, but if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in absence of the 
error a different result would have eventu-
ated, the error is prejudicial. 
4. Trial e=>l2)(l) 
Counsel of plaintiff in argument to the 
jury should be permitted to refer to and 
use all of the competent evidence he has 
marshalled and presented at the trial, and 
to explain its meaning and argue its signifi-
cance to his client's cause. 
5. Appeal and Error <S=3J05S(I) 
In action for death of deceased on 
ground that hospital allegedly negligently 
administered a transfusion of incompatible 
blood bringing on a kidney infection proxi-
mately causing death, error in excluding 
notations made by doctors on hospital rec-
ords and deemed pertinent to the care and 
treatment by persons performing duties in 
that regard was prejudicial error. 
6. Appeal and Error €=5843(1) 
Where the Supreme Court orders a 
new trial, it must pass upon all questions 
of law involved in a case presented upon 
appeal and necessary to a final determine' 
tion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 76(a). 
7. Evidence C=>5I2 
In action against hospital for death of 
deceased who allegedly was given an m-
R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 2S6 P.2d ^ 0 ; 
Boyd v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. K- Co. 
45 Utah 449, 146 P. 282. 
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ompatible blood transfusion, a nurse who ing that the hospital had negligently ad-
red for the deceased was entitled to ex- ministered a transfusion of incompatible 
rcss an opinion that deceased was given blood which brought on the kidney infec-
irood nursing care as against the contention tion, proximately causing her death, 
that such was the issue to be decided and
 T h e t w Q b a s k i s g u e s c o n t e s t e d b y t h e p a r . 
that the witness invaded the province of
 t i e s w e r e : ( 1 ) D i d M r s . j o s e p h r e c e i ve 
an incompatible blood transfusion from 
which she died; and (2) if so, was the de-
fendant hospital negligent in connection 
with administering it, or in failing to stop 
it after an unfavorable reaction was no-
ticed. The case was submitted to the jury 
which returned a verdict of no cause of 
action. Plaintiff appeals, charging error in 
certain rulings of the trial court relating 
to evidence and instructions. 
the jury. 
g. Evidence O506 
Whether testimony of an expert is as 
to the very issue before the jury is not a 
proper test as to its admissibility. 
9. Evidence <S=>508 
Where the subject of inquiry is in a 
field beyond the knowledge generally pos-
sessed by laymen, one properly qualified 
therein may testify to his opinion as an ex-
pert, and if the opinion evidence is such 
that it will aid the jury in understanding 
their problems it is admissible, irrespective 
of whether it bears directly upon ultimate 
fact that jury is to determine.3 
10. Evidence O 5 0 8 
A trial judge is allowed a wide discre-
tion in regard to the allowance of testimony 
of an expert, where the subject of the in-
quiry is in a field beyond the knowledge 
generally possessed by laymen. 
11. Trial <3=>295(l) 
Instructions must be considered togeth-
er in determining whether one instruction 
purportedly singled out one ground of al-
leged negligence and excluded others. 
George H. Searle, Elias Hansen, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, Albert R. Bow-
en, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Ten days following an operation for the 
removal of a tumor, Mrs. Lucille Joseph 
died in the L. D. S. Hospital of a "lower 
nephron nephrosis" (inflammation of the 
kidneys). Plaintiff, her husband, brought 
this action for himself and children, alleg-
3. Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d 
77; Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 
of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., Utah, 25S 
The controversy over the rulings on evi-
dence devolves upon the sustaining of de-
fendants objection to permitting plaintiff's 
counsel to read and use in his argument to 
the jury certain entries upon the hospital 
record made by two doctors, V. L. Rees and 
Kenneth A. Crockett, who had been called 
in to consult with respect to the treatment 
of Mrs. Joseph. The notations which coun-
sel indicated a desire to read are as follows: 
"Pelvic Laparoling 4-453 followed 
almost immediately by a chill and dark 
urine. * * * This pt is going into 
some type of renal decompensation 
possible on the basis of a transfusion 
reaction * * *." Signed "V. L. 
Rees." 
And at the bottom of the same page of the 
Progress Notes: 
"This is undoubtedly a Lower Neph-
rons Syndrome from hemolitic Blood 
transfusion * * *." Signed "KAC" 
The above entries have a direct bearing 
on a critical and disputed issue: whether 
Mrs. Joseph received a transfusion of in-
compatible blood which caused her death. 
During the trial, Dr. Val Sundwall, who 
had performed the initial operation on 
April 4, testified that in his opinion the pa-
tient probably died as a result of a blood 
P.2d 445; Hooper v. General Motors, 
Utah, 260 P.2d 549; Jiminez v. O'Brien, 
117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d 337. 
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transfusion reaction. However, Dr. John 
H. Carlquist, the pathologist and director of 
laboratories at the hospital, who was called 
in on the case and made tests of the patient 
after difficulties had developed, and who 
qualified as an expert in the field of blood 
transfusions and blood typing, being sub-
jected to a searching examination by coun-
sel for plaintiffs, was obviously evasive and 
persistently refused to concede that there 
was any definite proof that Mrs. Joseph 
either received, or died as a result of, a 
transfusion reaction. This is borne out by 
the following extracts from his testimony: 
"Q. * * * now, that nephrosis 
was caused, was it not, by this incom-
patible blood? A. I have never said 
that. 
"Q. But you didn't say it wasn't, 
did you? A. I said, I have had no 
proof it was incompatible blood. 
"Q. You did say and you do be-
lieve now that that might have caused 
it? A. I have no proof of it. 
"Q. That is the most probable cause 
of it, isn't it. A. I have never been 
able to prove it. 
* * * * * * 
"Q. If this had been properly 
typed, this haematolysis would not have 
occurred, would it? A. I have never 
seen any evidence of haematolysis in 
this case. 
* * * * * * 
"Q. But you doubt very much if 
she had haematolysis, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir; I was never able to 
prove there was any haematolysis took 
place. 
* * * * * * 
"Q. Now, it is your testimony, to 
make it clear, that this patient didn't 
have haematolysis ? A. No, sir, I was 
never able to prove there was any hae-
matolysis. 
!. See e. g. New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Taylor, 79 U.S.AppD.C. 66, 147 F.2d 
297. 
"Q. But was that not the most like-
ly injury to her kidney—most obvious? 
A. It was one that had to be con-
sidered, * * *." 
The above are but representative ex-
cerpts from several pages of similar testi-
mony of Dr. Carlquist. The fact that he 
repeatedly refused to admit that there was 
any evidence from which a conclusion could 
be drawn that the patient had had an in-
compatible blood transfusion or that her 
death resulted from one, shows plainly that 
the entries in the record did not represent 
merely a recapitulation of other testimony 
brought out at the trial, but could reason-
ably be interpreted as opposed to his testi-
mony. It was therefore evidence of ex-
treme importance to the plaintiff's theory 
as to the cause of death. That issue was 
submitted to the jury by the court in In-
struction No. 13. They were told that if 
they believed that "the death of Mrs. Jo-
seph was from a cause other than the ad-
ministration of incompatible blood * * *" 
then they must return a verdict of "no 
cause of action." 
[1] Defendant urges that inasmuch as 
the doctors who made the notations were 
not employees of the hospital, such entries 
were neither admissible nor binding upon 
it. We are aware of rulings from other 
jurisdictions that exclude such record evi-
dence where opinions are reflected.1 But 
we adhere to the view which admits evi-
dence of the character here in question not-
withstanding the fact that it represents in 
part doctors' opinions as to the patients 
condition.2 The notations were recorded 
as information deemed pertinent to the care 
and treatment by persons performing dutie* 
in that regard. We have heretofore recog-
nized that the entering of data on hospit* 
records by personnel so engaged earn 
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness ta 
render them admissible in evidence *n 
2. In re Richards' Estate, 5 Utah 2d 10* 
297 P.2d 542; Allen v. St. Louis Public 
365 Mo. 677, 2S5 S.W.2d 663; ?e°Vl*Z\ 
Gorgol, 122 Cal.App.2d 231, 265 I-*" 
69. 
trt? 
rthv of consideration by the fact finder 
fa connecting with the other evidence in the 
3 The doctors attending Mrs. Joseph 
within such classification and the 
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[3] It is not always easy to tell when an 
error should be regarded as prejudicial, 
as attested by the division of the court in 
this case. It is necessary to survey all of 
the facts and circumstances disclosed by 
the record and if, in so doing, the error ap-
pears to be of such a nature that it can be 
said with assurance that it was of no ma-
terial consequence in its effect upon the 
trial because reasonable minds would have 
arrived at the same result, regardless of 
such error, it would be harmless and the 
granting of a new trial would not be war-
ranted. On the other hand, if it appears to 
be of sufficient moment that there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that in the absence of 
such error a different result would have 
eventuated, the error should be regarded 
as prejudicial and relief should be granted. 
Measured by such considerations we assay 
the possible effect of the error complained 
of, realizing of course that it is now quite 
impossible to tell definitely whether the 
verdict would have been different. 
[4] In regard to the suggestion that the 
records were in evidence for the jury to 
read if they so desired, it is pertinent to look 
at the notations themselves, quoted in the 
third paragraph of this opinion. It will 
hardly be denied that they are couched in 
such terms that they could stand some elab-
oration for the benefit of those uninitiated 
in the mysteries of medical terminology. 
This emphasizes the importance of accord-
ing plaintiff's counsel the opportunity of 
performing one of his essential functions: 
that of arguing his case to the jury. In do-
ing so, he should be permitted to refer to 
and use ail of the competent evidence he 
has marshalled and presented in the trial, 
and to explain its meaning and argue its 
significance to his client's cause.6 
Boyd v. Sam Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 
45 Utah 449, 146 P. 2S2. 
6. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 
151 Fla. 564, 10 So.2d 85; Givans v. 
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 238 
Minn. 161, 56 N.W.2d 306, 38 A.L.R. 
2d 1393; Annotation, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396; 
53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 453. 
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entries they made upon the hospital record 
in connection with their duties in render-
iJnr medical service to this patient are com-
nctcnt evidence to be considered for such 
purpose. It is suggested that plaintiff could 
have called the doctors as witnesses. But 
whv should he do so if he was satisfied with 
the'records. The defendant, likewise, could 
have called the doctors had it so desired. 
Ancnt defendant's contention in regard to 
matter which might obviously be inadmis-
sible, e.g. entries which might be made by 
unauthorized persons having no connection 
with it, we remark aside that if some med-
dler, having no duty nor legitimate business 
doing so, made entries upon the hospital 
record, that would be subject to explanation 
by the hospital, facts not present here. 
[2] The defendant further argues that, 
assuming the notations are competent evi-
dence, it was nevertheless but harmless 
error for the trial court to sustain his ob-
jection to their being read and argued to 
the jury because the records had actually 
been received in evidence and were there 
for the jury to read if they so desired. It 
suggests, therefore, that the result could 
not have been different in the absence of 
the error. We are aware of and in accord 
with the mandate not to reverse a case 
merely because of error, and we will do so 
only when it appears to be prejudicial to 
the rights of a party.4 Neither this statu-
tory mandate, nor the policy we follow 
thereunder, goes so far as to require that 
we ignore errors that may have a sub-
stantial effect upon the outcome of a trial.5 
3
- In re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 
297 P.2d 542. 
*• Rule 61, U.R.C.P.; See Startin v. Mad-
sen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, and au-
thorities therein cited. 
5
- Bowden v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 
3 Utah 2d 444, 2S6 P.2d 240; Startin v. 
Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834; 
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[5] Some indication of the importance 
of the error with which we are here con-
cerned is to be found in the fact that counsel 
thought the matter of sufficient consequence 
that he objected to the reading and use of 
the evidence in the argument to the jury. 
It strikes the writer as being somewhat in-
consistent that counsel now urges that de-
priving plaintiff of the use of such evidence 
was merely harmless error. If it is so plain 
that it would not have helped plaintiff's 
case, one is led to wonder why counsel made 
the objection and insisted that it not be 
used. The obvious answer seems to be that 
defendant's counsel was actually apprehen-
sive that it may have a substantial effect 
against his client. Of course, he could not 
be sure, nor can we. 
In view of the fact that there is such sub-
stantial doubt that we cannot, with any de-
gree of assurance, affirm that the use of 
such evidence would not have been helpful 
to the plaintiff, the doubt should be resolved 
in favor of allowing him to have a full and 
fair presentation of his cause to the jury. 
[6] A new trial being ordered, it is our 
duty to "pass upon * * * all questions 
of law involved in the case presented upon 
the appeal and necessary to final determina-
tion * * *,"7 accordingly we comment 
briefly on two other assignments of error. 
[7-10] The first is plaintiff's contention 
that a nurse who cared for deceased could 
not express an opinion that she was given 
good nursing care. The objection was on 
the ground that this was the very issue to 
be decided by the jury and the witness thus 
invaded its province. This objection is 
untenable. Whether the testimony of an 
expert is as to "the very issue before the 
jury" is not a proper test as to its admis-
sibility. Where the subject of inquiry is 
in a field beyond the knowledge gen-
7. Rule 7G(a), U.R.C.P. 
8. Baker v. Wycoc, 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d 
77; United States v. Bowman, 10 Cir., 
73 F.2d 716; 7 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 
191S et seq.; McCormick, Evidence p. 
25; see Justice Wade's separate opinions 
in: Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 
erally possessed by laymen, one properly 
qualified therein may be permitted to testi-
fy to his opinion as an expert. If the opin-
ion evidence is such that it will aid the jury 
in understanding their problems and lead 
them to the truth as to disputed issues of 
fact, it is competent and admissible, irre-
spective of whether it bears directly upon 
the ultimate fact the jury is to determine.8 
And the trial judge is allowed a wide dis-
cretion in regard to the allowance of such 
testimony.9 
[11] Concerning an instruction which 
purportedly singled out one ground of al-
leged negligence and thus excluded others: 
upon retrial it may be well for the court to 
consider rephrasing it; yet if the instruc-
tions are considered all together, as they 
must be, we doubt that it can fairly be said 
that the instruction had the effect plaintiff 
suggests. 
Remanded for a new trial. Costs to ap-
pellants. 
WADE and WORTHEN, J J., concur. 
McDONOUGH, Chief Justice (dissent-
ing). 
I am unable to concur in the decision of 
the majority wherein it is held that the 
trial court committed prejudicial error in 
refusing counsel permission to argue to the 
jury the notations in the hospital record 
purportedly made by Drs. Rees and Crock-
ett. In considering this question, more of 
the factual background than is revealed by 
the opinion must, in the judgment of the 
writer, be considered. 
It is first to be observed that the notations 
referred to are conclusions of the persons 
making the notations. The record is ^ 
solutely devoid of evidence which would 
of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., Utah. 25$ 
P.2d 445; Hooper v. General Motors, 
Utah, 260 P.2d 549; Jiminez v. O'Brien, 
117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d S37. 
9. See United States v. Bowman, supra; 
McCormick, Evidence p. 26; 7 Wigmore 
Evidence, Sees. 1920. 1921. 
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the oualifications of such persons here dealing with the purported opinions 
than that they are medical doctors, of experts. 
pre* 
t ^ t their training and experience is, is 
1< »ho*n. Insofar as revealed by the 
rd the conclusions referred to were 
£^V\vithot: t ever seeing the patient All 
& record reveals is that when Dr. Sund-
TJ' the attending physician, was shown 
dark sr.mple of urine which indicated that 
£crc was probably blood in the urine, he 
exul ted with Dr. Rees and Dr. Crockett. 
Whether they had anything else before 
t i c m 0thcr than the other notations on the 
fcjjpital record does not appear. These 
facts are important, since it is elementary 
that for a person to give his opinion as an 
expert, a foundation for his testimony must 
be laid by showing his qualifications and the 
extent of information upon which he bases 
his conclusions. The absence of such show-
ing is more significant when it is recalled 
that Dr. Crockett and Dr. Rees were both 
lubpocnacd by the plaintiff, were present 
in court and were not called upon to testify. 
The only explanation offered in appellant's 
brief for not calling the doctors is the 
following: 
"It is reasonable to assume that when 
Exhibit 2-D was received in evidence, 
the necessity of calling the doctors 
whose statements were contained in 
such exhibit, in great part, disappeared 
and they were excused." 
In the case of In re Richards' Estate, 
cited in the opinion of the court, there is 
quoted with approval from the prior case 
of Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819, 823, 120 
A.L.R. 1117, the following: 
"Before such records can be admit-
ted, in the absence of statute, the of-
fering party must show the necessity 
of admitting the records without re-
quiring the person or several persons 
who made the records to testify." 
« cannot be overemphasized that we are not 
tare dealing with notations of fact relative 
to symptoms, treatment, directions to hospi-
kl staff and other factual matters. We are 
Counsel were not misled by the stipula-
tion that the hospital records might be re-
ceived in evidence, into believing that every-
thing that might be contained in the hospi-
tal record was competent. During the 
cross-examination of Dr. Carlquist, when 
he was confronted with the notations in the 
record made by Dr. Rees and Dr. Crockett, 
respondent's counsel objected on the ground 
that it was not cross-examination and that 
it was hearsay. He was thereby advised 
that the contention would be made by coun-
sel that this evidence could not be con-
sidered by the jury. Some 70 pages of tes-
timony were thereafter adduced, and there 
was ample opportunity for counsel to re-
call Drs. Crockett and Rees and present 
their evidence to the jury. Whether their 
conclusions as to the cause of the uremia 
from which the patient concededly died 
would be the same at the time of the trial 
following an autopsy as they were when the 
notations were made cannot be determined. 
It is interesting, however, in that connection 
to note that Dr. Carlquist, the hospital 
pathologist, was confronted on cross-ex-
amination with statements made by him in 
his autopsy report. After stating therein 
the immediate cause of death and the symp-
toms leading up thereto his report stated: 
"The obvious answer is an incompatible 
blood transfusion." After that, the report 
went on to state that the doctor performed 
the autopsy and from that autopsy and other 
tests made he was unable to determine that 
there was an incompatible blood transfu-
sion. Thus, the hospital pathologist was of 
the same opinion, based upon the same 
factual data, as was Dr. Crockett and only 
changed his opinion upon further informa-
tion. 
Conceding, therefore, in view of the stip-
ulation, that it was error for the court not 
to permit counsel for the appellant to argue 
these notations to the jury—a conclusion 
which, to say the least, is doubtful—the 
writer is unable to find therein reversible 
or prejudicial error under the criteria sug-
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gested in the opinion of the court as a 
basis for determining that question. "It is 
necessary," says the opinion, "to survey all 
of the facts and circumstances disclosed by 
ihe record and if, in so doing, the error ap-
pears to be of such a nature that it can be 
said with assurance that it was of no ma-
terial consequence in its effect upon the trial 
because reasonable minds would have ar-
rived at the same result, regardless of such 
error, it would be harmless and the granting 
of a new trial would not be warranted." It 
is inconceivable to the writer that but for 
the alleged error the jury in this case would 
have arrived at a different result. Had 
counsel for appellants been permitted to ar-
gue these matters to the jury, they could 
give them dictionary definitions of words 
therein found, some of which the writer 
has been unable to find in Webster's Un-
abridged Dictionary, and to emphasize the 
word, "undoubtedly," in Dr. Crockett's no-
tation. Counsel could not testify as medi-
cal experts, nor could they testify as to the 
qualifications of the doctors who made the 
notations. Hod they been permitted, how-
ever, to argue these entries, counsel for the 
respondents would undoubtedly point out to 
the jury the matters hereinbefore set forth 
to meet any such argument made by counsel 
for the appellants. In evaluating the proba-
bility of a different result had counsel been 
permitted to so argue, an observation in 
appellant's brief is enlightening. All of 
the hospital records were permitted by the 
court to be taken to the jury room. Com-
menting upon that fact, counsel for the ap-
pellants in their brief said, "In this connec-
tion it may be noted that the jury could not 
have examined the contents of Exhibit 2-D 
because they reported that they had agreed 
on a verdict before counsel had time to take 
their exceptions to the instructions." In 
view of this, and bearing in mind that the 
ultimate issue to be decided was the negli-
gence of the defendant hospital, there does 
not appear to the writer a remote possi-
bility that the verdict would have been dif-
ferent had appellant's counsel been per-
mitted to comment upon the sketchy entries 
under discussion. Since I agree with the 
court's disposition of the other errors as-
signed, I would affirm the judgment below. 
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice McDOX-
OUGH. 
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